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JUDICIAL LEGISLATION
THOMAs H. RYAN*
T IS the popular thing today to attribute to the lawyer alone the loss
of public confidence in the bench and bar. Newspapers, maga-
zines, periodicals, pulpits and platforms criticise, caricature and ex-
coriate hin. Nor is the bench backward in berating and basting the
bar. In the opinions of our courts, in addresses to students and others,
and in discussions at conventions and conferences, strictures of the
bar by our judges abound. While it is true this criticism is directed
to abuses indulged in by but a small fraction of the members of the
legal profession, and is well intended, nevertheless, the public, failing
to distinguish between the ninety-nine per cent of lawyers who are
ethical and honorable, and the one per cent who are unprofessional and
dishonest, accepts as applying to the entire profession what is intended
only for a small number. If our judges realized that the courts suffer
more than the bar by these strictures, they would not occur so fre-
quently, for the public knows that all judges were once lawyers and it
rightly reasons, that elevation to the bench does not change the leopard's
spots.
Accepting the judges' appraisment of the pettifoggar as applying to
the entire legal profession, the people reason that a judge is no better
than the lawyers from whose ranks he was drawn, but is invested with
power to do greater mischief. A lawyer is expected to be a partisan,
whose every effort is directed to save his client harmless. In doing this,
if he over-steps law and ethical standards, this departure from
propriety is attributed to his zeal to help his client and to his desire to
establish a reputation which will insure his being made a judge. The
people, however, expect a judge to be without bias and just, but, hav-
ing in mind his origin, that is, his once having been a lawyer, they are
apt to attribute to corrupt motives acts of his which run counter to
the prevailing public opinion.
In my opinion, the loss of public confidence in the bench and bar
has been brought about mainly by the action of the bench in invading
the law-making field and therein legislating by its decisions. Not
only have our courts frequently crossed the boundary line which
separates the judicial from the legislative field at points where that
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line is irregular and indistinct, but also have broken down the fence
between these fields, directly connecting the corner posts which were
established and placed by the constitution itself.
Our system of courts and the principles govermng them are derived
from the common law But in England, the court originally was the
king himself. When he ceased to hold the court in person, he delegated
this function to one or more of his officers. Such an officer exercised
therein the power of the king. His acts could be questioned by no one
but the king. When we severed connection with the mother country,
we adopted the common law in so far as it did not differ from our
theory of government. And a fundamental difference there is that the
power vested in the king is here vested in the body of the people. The
courts sit as their representatives and exercise only such power as ias
been granted them either expressly or by implication. If the courts
of England at the time of the adoption of our constitution had the power
to set aside the findings of fact of juries, it was exercised on the theory
that the courts possess the plenary power of the king who can do no
wrong. Our courts, in setting aside the findings of juries, have done
so on the theory that they possess the power of the sovereign, forgeting
that the right of trial by jury, uncontrolled by the court, excepting in
so far as control is consistent with our theory of sovereignty, is
guaranteed by the fundamental law, of the land.
The trial by jury which our constitution guarantees, comprehends
every act of the jury from the time it is sworn to try the issues to the
return of the verdict and discharge from service. The jury's func-
tion is fixed by the constitution itself. The presiding judge, without
legislative authorization, has no more power to set aside the jury's
findings as to the amount of the damages sustained, than he has to set
aside the verdict because the jury, where the testimony was in con-
flict, gave weight to certain testimony which he believed unworthy of
belief. In other words, there is just as much authority in the judge
to set aside the verdict of the jury because the jury gave no weight to
the testimony of witnesses which he believed to be weighty, as there is
to set aside the verdict because the jury determined from the evidence
the damages were greater than what he believed them to be.
To concede that a judge has the right to invade the jury's preroga-
tives in one particular is to open wide the door of the jury room to the
domination of a Jefferys. Besides, it is only on the assumption that
the jury is either biased, corrupt or incompetent, or all of them, and
on the assumption of virtues by the court which the jury does not
possess, that the court interferes. What pap does the judicial office
supply that makes superhuman, beings of mortal clay? But yesterday
our judges were practing lawyers, possessing the virtues and frailties
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of the human race. Today, as the servants of the people, whom they
have sworn to serve, they possess wisdom that is little short of omni-
science itself. The trial judge, having no prejudices, no sympathies, no
selfish motives, but possessing the omniscience of the Almighty has no
trouble to point out the errors of the jury and to correct the same by
reducing the damages found to an amount by him known to be just and
compensative. The appellate court, having all the virtues of the trial
court, and others of which the people know not, and could not com-
prehend if told them, and having the additional advantage of long dis-
tance observation of what took place in the jury room months or years
before, does not hesitate to mete out exact justice by reducing the
damages found by the jury, and already reduced by the trial court,
to a lesser sum, assigning as reasons therefor that,
"Such amount should be placed as low as an intelligent jury properly
instructed, in the exercise, of sound judgment upon the evidence and
the law applicable thereto, would be liable to place it." I
Of course, there is no implication in the language used that the jury
was not "intelligent," nor that the trial judge was not able to
"properly" instruct them. Neither is it implied that the trial judge who
reduced the damages found by the jury at $3,500 to $1,8oo, (the ap-
pellate court reduced the damages $8oo more) had not exercised
"sound judgment." Nor that the dissenting justice of the supreme
court, who agreed with the trial judge as to the damages, lacked intel-
ligence or sound judgment.
As was said by our supreme court in the case of Karsteadt v
Phillip Gross H. & C Company,2 the verdict of the jury is evidently no
guide as to the proper amount of the recovery It does not matter to
our courts that the legislature enacted, "that the jury may give such
damages, not exceeding $io,ooo.oo as they may deem fair and just in
reference to the pecuniary injury, resulting from such death." Para-
phrasing the language applied by the court to the jury in the Karsteaat
case, it is probable the legislature's sympathy ran away with their judg-
ment when they enacted Section 4256. The legislature did act in
language which admits of but one meaning. "The ultimate end of
judicial construction is not to determine what the legislature meant,
but what the language used by the legislature means." Perhaps the
legislature did not mean what their language clearly expresses, or
perhaps the legislature which enacted the law was not "intelligent."
These questions concern the legislature alone. The courts, which the
benighted believe are a co-ordinate branch of our government, like the
'Ptak v. Kuteineyer, i82 Wis. 357.
2 179 Wis. 11O.
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king of old, cannot err, cannot do wrong, and possess all power. The
people, who believed that a quietus had been forever placed upon the
divine right of kings and courts, have reckoned without their host.
There remain the Almighty courts.
Once having invaded the legislative field, our courts are careless in
their logic. Sometimes they hold the jury is not intelligent enough to
answer questions of fact because of lack of light, at other times, be-
cause too much light has been shed on the facts.
The first special verdict statute, enacted in 1856, was in derogation of
the common law, which provides for a general verdict only Section 10
of Chapter 132 of the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin, 1858, distinguished
and defined the two verdicts as follows
"A general verdict is that by which the jury pronounced generally
upon all or any of the issues, either in favor of the plaintiff or defendant.
A special verdict is that by which the jury find the facts only, leaving
the judgment to the Court."
At common law and under the general verdict, it is held not only to
be proper, but necessary to instruct the jury, that
"the plaintiff cannot recover unless the defendant has been guilty of
negligence (defining it) which was the proximate cause (defining it) of
the injury to the plaintiff, nor unless the plaintiff has been free from
contributory- negligence,"
yet when first called upon to construe the special verdict statute, Ryan
v. Rockford Insurance Company,3 our court read into the statute that
which the legislature had not put in it, and, in order to justify its action,
cast aspersions on the jury, in saying-
"It has often been demonstrated in the trial of causes, that the non-
expert juryman is more liable than the experienced lawyer or judge
to be led away from the material issues of fact-involved by some col-
lateral circumstance of little or no significance, or by sympathy, bias
or prejudice."
If it be true that a juryman is more liable than the experienced lawyer
or judge to be led away from the material issues of fact by collateral
circumstances of little or no significance, it is because of his lack of
information and knowledge. To perform his constitutional function as
juryman, he is entitled to all the light, which under the general verdict,
the court is required to give him. Judicial legislation has taken from
him this light.
What a travesty on justice to promulgate a rule of law, that
"it is reversible error for the trial court by instructions to the jury
to inform the jury expressly or by necessary implications of the effect
377 Wis. 611.
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of an answer or answers to a question or questions of a special verdict
upon the ultimate right of either party litigant to recover or upon; the
ultimate liability of either party litigant I"
If it is error for the court to thus inform the jury, why should a juror
who possesses this knowledge be competent to sit in the case? If he is
disqualified thereby to sit in the case, then the jury should be interro-
gated on the voir dire as to their education and knowledge with the
end in view to obtain a jury so ignorant that they cannot comprehend
the effect of their answers upon the final result. Eternal ignorance is
the price of justice.
It is a holy and wholesome thought in our judges to entertain a
good opinion of their own honesty and ability, (which no attorney ques-
tions they possess) but in doing this, it is not necessary by their acts to
under value or slander the people who elected them to office and whom
they have sworn to serve. The fact that the members of the same court
are not always able to agree as to the amount of damages that should
have been found by the jury, together with the fact that courts have
differed in opinion as much as juries, (some state courts considering as
proper what is deemed excessive in others) should be a warning to
our courts to abandon both the legislative and the jury fields and fol-
low. "those safeguards to judicial footsteps that have been located along
the judicial pathway by the accumulated wisdom of ages." Especially
should this be done in view of the fact that the people already have
placed their stamp of disapproval on the courts (i) by divesting them
of jurisdiction in industrial cases and by conferring such jurisdiction
upon the Industrial Commission, using as their main argument for the
change, the perversion of the special verdict and the inadequacy of
damages awarded for personal injuries, and also (2) by grafting upon
the injunction statutes the right of trial by jury in issues of fact arising
in any matter relating to violation of any injunction in labor disputes.
The enactment into law of the recall of judges and judicial decisions,
proposed by men of courage but of distorted vision, needs but a real
grievance against our courts and an agitator to fan into flames the
slumbering discontent of the masses. In this day of class conscious-
ness, the judges should see to it that they themselves furnish the toilers
of this nation no real grievance against the courts. Such a grievance is
furnished when they curtail "the palladeum of our civil rights,"-trial
by jury In most cases where the court has assumed control of the
jury's verdict, such control has operated against the interest of the poor
and lowly This may be but a c.incidence, but it is difficult to convince
those injuriously affected that it is. They cannot understand why the
jury's verdict should not be final.
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Instead of making the jury's verdict simply advisory to the court, the
courts should accept the damages found by the jury, after being clearly
instructed by the court as is now required when a general verdict is
submitted, as controlling and inviolable, if the damages so found are
within the limitations of the statutes, and, in order to counter-act the
mischief heretofore done by the courts and the insidious propagandist
whose aim is to undermine constitutional government, should stress, on
every proper occasion, the fact that trial by jury, consistent with our
theory of sovereignty, obtains in these United States.
